Negotiating with Taliban may be necessary evil

It was on Aug. 15, 2021, that Afghanistan officially fell to the Taliban. The sudden resurgence of the Taliban on the eve of the announced U.S. military withdrawal seemed to take everyone by surprise – except for the people of Afghanistan.

The Pentagon was banking on the fact that the 350,000 strong Afghan security forces, which they had equipped, trained and paid the salaries, would offer at least a few months of resistance against the Taliban fighters.

That would have allowed the western media to close up their Kabul bureaus and head home whereby the eventual collapse of the U.S. appointed Afghan puppet government would have taken place virtually unseen.

However, while the majority of the Afghan security forces were illiterate, that does not mean they were stupid enough to fight for a lost cause.

With the American military departing, these Afghan soldiers knew that the days of President Ashraf Ghani were numbered in the hours, and more importantly, so did Ghani.

By the time the embattled Afghan president bugged out of Kabul and flew into a self-imposed exile, the vast majority of the Afghan security forces had simply melted away without firing a shot.

Canada had ended its combat mission to Afghanistan in 2011, and had concluded the subsequent training mission in 2014.

Nevertheless, many selfdelusional Canadian military pundits had continued to believe that a U.S.-NATO victory in Afghanistan was still the most likely outcome of this conflict.

Buying into this school of thought, the Canadian government had made essentially no contingency plan for an orderly withdrawal in the case of the Taliban ever regaining absolute control over Afghanistan.

This meant that as the Taliban fighters entered Kabul, the Canadian Embassy staff could not get themselves out fast enough.

As a result, thousands of Afghans who had at one point assisted the Canadian military effort in Afghanistan were left pleading for asylum out of fear of Taliban revenge.

Many veterans, including former senior military commanders, bellicosely called upon the Canadian government to invoke some sort of emergency measures to assist in bringing these imperilled Afghans to safety.

With our embassy in Kabul abandoned and the Taliban running Afghanistan, this would be no simple feat.

For those who have closely followed the bouncing ball, the Afghan Embassy in Ottawa has defiantly claimed that it will remain operational.

Ambassador Hassan Soroosh was the representative of the hastily deposed Ghani regime, and he maintains that he in no way represents the Taliban.

By laying off staff and husbanding their existing funds, Soroosh plans to keep the Afghan Embassy functioning as long as possible.

The problem with this scenario is that the Ghani government is gone and these Afghan diplomats have absolutely no status with the now-ruling Taliban regime.

While there may be a sense of loyalty to these impotent Afghan diplomats, who once represented the U.s.-installed puppet regime in Kabul, the truth is that Canada needs to recognize the reality that they are now an impediment to future relations with a Talibancontrolled Afghanistan.

If we wish to have any hope of negotiating safe passages for those Afghans who once assisted us, it will mean entering into negotiations with the Taliban.

Some of our NATO allies, such as Turkey have already come to that conclusion and they have initiated an exchange of diplomatic missions.

This is a pragmatic approach that recognizes the reality of the political situation on the ground in Afghanistan.

For many Canadians, especially our veterans, the very thought of entering into talks with the Taliban will be repugnant.

When we first deployed troops into Afghanistan in 2002, the Taliban were portrayed as evil incarnate. Throughout our 12-year military intervention, they were the hated enemy, responsible for the death of 158 of our soldiers and the wounding of another 2,000 Canadian service-members.

In 2007, at the height of our combat mission when it seemed our troops were bogged down in a bloody quagmire, then NDP leader Jack Layton had the temerity to suggest that we might try a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.

In response, the pro-war hawks had denounced Layton as a defeatist and they labelled him derisively as Taliban Jack!

Now that they have won a complete military victory and regained control of the entire country, we would be entering into negotiations with the Taliban from a far less advantageous position.

Although Canada officially established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan in 1968, this was a purely symbolic agreement.

It was not until 2003, following the U.S. led occupation, that Canada actually established an embassy in Kabul and appointed an ambassador to Afghanistan. Prior to that juncture, Canada-afghan relations were almost nonexistent.

However, now that Canada has committed such a vast amount of personnel and resources to Afghanistan over the past two decades, we have actually established a binding connection, not the least of which is the Afghan-canadian diaspora, which includes many of those who served alongside our soldiers.

As tough a pill as it might seem to swallow, for Canada to maintain any working relationship with Afghanistan, it must offer some level of recognition to the Taliban.

A first step might be to quietly shutter the Afghan Embassy in Ottawa.